Bullies exploit an unfortunate game theoretic equilibrium.

· Bits and Bobs 4/7/25
  • Bullies exploit an unfortunate game theoretic equilibrium.
    • You'd rather the bully not notice you, but if he's going to notice you you'd prefer for him to think you're on his side.
      • So that means that if you can't escape his notice (e,g. you loom too large) you need to suck up to him.
    • That's the incentive for each individual.
    • But that means that everyone puts their head down and lets the bully get away with whatever he wants.
    • The more that everyone puts their head down, the stronger the disincentive for everyone else to stick their neck out, because they'd stand out prominently and definitely get smacked down.
    • In some contexts there's a bigger authority that can smack the bully down.
    • But if there isn't one, the only way is for everyone to rise up against the bully at once.
    • That can happen if there's a supercritical state where everyone is upset but no one wants to stick their neck out.
    • Those supercritical moments are prone to catastrophic shattering when the right inciting incident comes along that everyone simultaneously can see everyone agrees the bully has crossed the line.
      • As everyone sees others stick their neck out, they feel emboldened too.